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In Whose Custody? Miranda, Emergency 
Medical Care & Criminal Defendants 
Kayley Berger* 
“Respect for the rule of law in all its dimensions is critical to the fair administration of 
justice, public order, and protection of fundamental freedoms.”1 The rule of law surrounding 
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination will not be respected by the police or 
public at large until major loopholes that allow the police “to take advantage of indigence in 
the administration of justice”2 are closed. The major loophole this Note tackles is the “in 
custody” requirement for Miranda warnings, which allows officers to question suspects without 
providing them with a Miranda warning. Specifically, this Note focuses on the damage such 
a loophole causes in the context of emergency medical care. It considers scenarios in which the 
power dynamics are so severe the suspect involuntarily confesses to a crime. To close this specific 
loophole, courts must expand what is considered “custodial” to represent the actual judicial 
intent behind Miranda: protecting the disadvantaged from state coercion and abuse. This 
conclusion is rooted in the judicial ideology that is used in the other Criminal Constitutional 
Revolution cases, which all sought to protect against police tendency to take advantage of 
indigence. This Note is not seeking to expand the rights of the accused. Rather, it is focused 
on closing a loophole in an existing right. 
 
* Kayley Berger is a J.D./M.B.A. Candidate at UC Irvine School of Law. Kayley would like to thank 
Professor Leslie Culver for the mentorship and feedback Professor Culver provided throughout the 
research and writing process. Kayley is also extremely grateful for the editing efforts of Catherine 
Rosoff, Sumouni Basu, Chris Lawrence, Esther Lim, Priscilla Perez, Sophie Paeng, Nadia Blant, Alicia 
Hernandez, Alice Doyle, and Christopher Su. 
1. Elizabeth Andersen & Ted Piccone, The Meaning, Measuring, and Mattering of the Rule of 
Law, 67 DEP’T JUST. J. FED. L. & PRAC. 103, 103 (2019); see also JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its 
Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210, 210 (1st ed. 1979),  
(“F.A. Hayek has provided one of the clearest and most powerful formulations of the ideal of the rule 
of law: ‘stripped of all technicalities this means that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed 
and announced beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the 
authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances, and to plan one’s individual affairs on the 
basis of this knowledge.’” (quoting FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 54 (1944))). 
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 472 (1966); see Thomas M. Riordan, Comment, Copping 
an Attitude: Rule of Law Lessons from the Rodney King Incident, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 675, 676 (1994) 
(“[D]espite apparent adherence to rule of law values, the current system has serious flaws that, if left 
unaddressed, may lead to a breakdown of the legal order.”). 
First to Printer_Berger .docx (Do Not Delete) 4/27/21  6:18 AM 
1198 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:1197 
Introduction .................................................................................................................. 1198 
I.  The Scenario: Police, Emergency Medical Care & Suspicion .................. 1199 
II.  Judicial Intent .................................................................................................. 1203 
III.  Fixing Loopholes in Miranda ......................................................................... 1205 
IV.  The Right to Emergency Medical Care ....................................................... 1206 
V.  Whose Reasonable Person Standard? The Social Implications of a 
“Colorblind” Rule of Law ............................................................................. 1208 
VI.  Proposed Solution .......................................................................................... 1210 
A. Role of the Courts .................................................................................. 1210 
B. Role of Attorneys ................................................................................... 1211 
C. Role of Lawmakers ................................................................................ 1212 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 1212 
 
“While authorities are not required to relieve the accused of his poverty, they have the 
obligation not to take advantage of indigence in the administration of justice.”3 
INTRODUCTION 
“‘[O]ur contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but of what may be.’”4 
The Criminal Constitutional Revolution5 was a major victory for the rule of 
law. During this era, the Warren Court changed the criminal justice system through 
a sequence of rulings designed to ensure the de jure rights in the U.S. Constitution 
would be enjoyed in practice. Miranda v. Arizona was such a ruling, minimizing the 
chance that ignorance could deprive someone of their right to remain silent. 
This Note seeks to address a peculiarity in the subsequent interpretation of 
the requirements of Miranda warnings. Specifically, Miranda warnings are only 
necessary when a suspect is questioned while being held in police custody because 
this is where the potential for police abuse and coercion is highest and when the 
uninformed are most vulnerable to confusion as to the right to remain silent.6 But 
interrogating a suspect who is receiving emergency medical treatment poses a 
similar threat of abuse, coercion, and confusion; yet it often requires no Miranda 
warning.7 This Note argues a warning is necessary in such a situation. 
This Note proceeds in six Parts. Part I lays out the type of scenario this Note 
seeks to prevent by utilizing State v. Clappes as a case study.8 Part I also identifies 
 
3. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 472. 
4. Id. at 443 (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)). 
5. When this Note refers to the “Criminal Constitutional Revolution,” it is referring to the 
period in which the Warren Court “extended new constitutional protections to criminal defendants in 
state court.” Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s 
Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1364 n.14 (2004). Others may refer 
to this period as the “Criminal Procedure Revolution.” See, e.g., id. 
6. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457–60. 
7. See, e.g., Wilson v. Coon, 808 F.2d 688, 689 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding Miranda not required in 
emergency medical-care interrogation when the primary purpose of the detention was medical).  
8. 344 N.W.2d 141 (Wis. 1984). 
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problematic questions the Clappes case raises in light of the Warren Court’s decision 
in Miranda v. Arizona. Part II discusses the judicial intent behind the Warren Court’s 
transformation of criminal procedure while paying particular attention to why 
Miranda warnings were created. Part III makes the case for closing loopholes in 
Miranda by analogy to the two-step interrogation procedure, another means of 
eliciting incriminating testimony, which was found to contravene the intent of 
Miranda and thus unconstitutional in Missouri v. Seibert.9 Part IV establishes 
background on the right to emergency medical care, and Part V considers social 
contexts in which that right might not be well understood or trusted, creating scope 
for coercion and abuse. Part VI outlines a threefold solution that calls upon courts, 
attorneys, and lawmakers to take actions that will protect the rights of individuals 
who are receiving emergency medical care and are suspected of having committed 
a crime.  
I. THE SCENARIO: POLICE, EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE & SUSPICION 
“[W]hatever the background of the person interrogated, a warning at the time of 
interrogation is indispensable to overcome its pressures and to insure that the individual 
knows he is free to exercise the privilege at that point in time.”10 
On May 20, 1980, at around 11:30 p.m., a deadly car accident occurred on 
Highway E in Waupaca County, Wisconsin.11 When the car crashed, three people 
were inside: One died while still in the vehicle, and one died after being thrown 
from the vehicle.12 The last person, Douglas Clappes, was thrown from the vehicle 
and suffered “lacerations, a ruptured bladder, a dislocated elbow, a fractured femur, 
a fractured pelvis, and shock.”13 Despite Clappes’s clearly fragile condition and the 
presence of several medical-care professionals, 
[w]hile he was on the emergency room table and in shock, two police 
officers questioned Clappes about the accident. They suspected Clappes 
was the driver but did not advise him of his Miranda rights.  
  One of the officers [even] questioned Clappes in a loud voice. During 
the questioning, Clappes identified the victims and admitted he was the 
driver of the car. Clappes was charged with . . . two counts  
of homicide . . . .14 
To be clear, the officers questioned Clappes because they learned he was not 
licensed and “suspected [he] was the driver.”15 This is evident as the officers asked 
Clappes “[a]nd you were driving; is that right?” twice while standing over him and 
 
9. 542 U.S. 600 (2004). 
10. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469. 
11. State v. Clappes, 401 N.W.2d 759, 761 (Wis. 1987). 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. State v. Clappes, No. 82-565-CR, 1983 WL 162143, at *1 (Wis. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 1983), 
rev’d, 344 N.W.2d 141 (Wis. 1984). 
15. Id.; see also Clappes, 344 N.W.2d at 142.  
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speaking in a loud voice.16 Then, unsurprisingly, “[i]mmediately following this 
questioning, the defendant was arrested and was issued a citation charging him with 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.”17 
The Clappes case raises several questions because the police officers clearly 
suspected Clappes committed a crime (which they ultimately suspected caused the 
accident), questioned him about it, and obtained incriminating statements but did 
not provide him with a Miranda warning.  
First, why was Clappes not read his Miranda rights?18 Police are required to 
give Miranda warnings any time a suspect is in custody, suspected to have 
committed a crime, and interrogated.19 An interrogation consists of “words or 
actions on the part of police officers” that police should know are “reasonably likely 
to elicit an incriminating response.”20 And “for Fifth Amendment purposes, ‘police 
officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary to 
secure their own safety or the safety of the public and questions designed solely to 
elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect.’”21 For example, in People v. Bejasa, the 
“defendant was asked questions such as, ‘[w]hat have you been drinking?’ and ‘[h]ow 
much?’ These questions contrast strongly against general questions such as, ‘[w]ere 
you involved in the accident?’”22 In the Clappes case, the defendant was on an 
emergency room table when questioned about whether he had been drinking and 
driving.23 The police did not need to ask those questions to secure their own safety 
or the safety of the public. The officers had no need to fear for their own safety or 
the safety of the public because not only were the officers no longer at the scene of 
the accident, but the defendant was also on an emergency room table in shock. The 
police were asking the defendant those questions to elicit incriminating statements. 
As was the case in Bejasa, “[b]y the time [the police] contacted [the] defendant, [they] 
had moved past investigation and into the realm of inculpation.”24 
A suspect is in custody if a reasonable person in the same situation would not 
feel free to terminate the interrogation and leave.25 However, courts have held “the 
 
16. Clappes, 344 N.W.2d at 143. 
17. Id. 
18. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“Prior to any questioning, the 
person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be 
used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained  
or appointed.”).  
19. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 434 (1984). 
20. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302 (1980). 
21. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 829 (2006) (quoting New York v. Quarles, 467  
U.S. 649, 658–59 (1984)).  
22. 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 80, 90 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing People v. Milham, 205 Cal. Rptr. 688, 692 
(Ct. App. 1984) (“Unlike the questions in Milham, the questions posed to defendant were such that the 
police should have known they would likely elicit an incriminating response.”). 
23. State v. Clappes, 344 N.W.2d. 141, 142–43 (Wis. 1984). 
24. Bejasa, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 90. 
25. See Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 100 (1995), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254; 
Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, What Constitutes “Custodial Interrogation” at Hospital by Police 
Officer Within Rule of Miranda v. Arizona Requiring that Suspect Be Informed of His or Her Federal 
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bare fact of physical restraint does not itself invoke the Miranda protections.”26 This 
distinction between being in custody and being physically restrained is especially 
troublesome in the emergency medical-care scenario because it creates an often 
hard-to-see distinction between the freedom to leave and the ability to leave. In the 
ordinary course of a noncustodial interrogation, a suspect who wishes to end an 
interrogation may ask, “Am I free to leave?” after which they can physically leave. 
If they do not physically leave, a diligent investigator may continue pursuing a line 
of questioning. Yet a suspect who is actively receiving medical treatment cannot 
leave. Therefore, when such a person wishes to end an interview, that person ought 
to have some verbal means to do so.27 They need to know they may refuse to speak 
with police and still receive the best possible medical care. Without such a 
protection, a zealous police officer’s questioning might interfere with the suspect’s 
ability to understand their medical condition and treatment options and even 
distract the health care workers. Even in cases where continued, unwanted 
interrogation does not destructively interfere with medical treatment, a reasonable 
person could have reason to fear that such interrogation could interfere; therefore, 
the interrogation would be coercive.28 
Miranda warnings are supposed to be provided to all suspects regardless of 
their identity because it is virtually impossible for police to know which suspects do 
and do not know their rights.29 The harsh reality is that although many people know 
 
Constitutional Rights Before Custodial Interrogation—Suspect Hospital Patient, 30 A.L.R.6th 103, § 2 
(2008) (“The determination of whether a suspect was in custody at the time of an interrogation requires 
consideration of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and, given those circumstances, 
whether a reasonable person would have felt that he or she was at liberty to terminate the questioning 
interrogation and leave.”). 
26. Wilson v. Coon, 808 F.2d 688, 689 (8th Cir. 1987). “The Court of Appeals . . . held that 
ambulance attendant’s physical restraint of defendant, in order to examine him for injuries received in 
automobile collision, at time police officer was questioning defendant did not constitute inherently 
coercive environment which required Miranda warnings be given . . . .” Id. at 688; see also People  
v. Mosley, 87 Cal. Rptr. 2d 325, 331 (Ct. App. 1999) (“Our review of the facts of the instant case leads 
us to the conclusion that defendant was not in custody within the meaning of Miranda when he was 
being treated by paramedics in the ambulance prior to being transported to the hospital. Any restraint 
of defendant’s freedom of action was caused by the need to treat his gunshot wound, which was still 
bleeding and was actively being treated during the interview.”); Brown v. Yates, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 
1071–72 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (ruling no Miranda warning was required where Petitioner, who was 
screaming in pain when dragged out of overturned vehicle by an officer, was questioned by the officer 
at scene of crime while he waited for emergency medical care to arrive). 
27. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (“In sum, the privilege is fulfilled only 
when the person is guaranteed the right to ‘remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered 
exercise of his own will.’” (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964))); see also id. at 478–79 
(“Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege and . . . fully effective means [must 
be] adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will 
be scrupulously honored . . . .”). 
28. See id. at 465 (“The abdication of the constitutional privilege—the choice on his part to 
speak to the police—was not made knowingly or competently because of the failure to apprise him of 
his rights; the compelling atmosphere of the [arguably] in-custody interrogation, and not an independent 
decision on his part, caused the defendant to speak.”).  
29. Id. at 468–69. 
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their legal rights and that they have a right to emergency medical care, the intent 
behind Miranda was to protect the most vulnerable in our society, many of whom 
do not know these rights. Even harsher is the reality that some of the most 
vulnerable in our society reasonably do not trust medical-care providers and believe 
that the right to emergency care is illusory.30 In the emergency medical-care context, 
the most vulnerable may be those who are undocumented, lack health insurance, or 
are unsophisticated regarding public institutions (e.g., some do not understand the 
difference between police and emergency medical technicians (EMTs)). In order to 
protect the rights of these particularly vulnerable individuals, we need to protect the 
rights of everyone under these circumstances. When the police approach someone 
they suspect of committing a crime and question the suspect to elicit incriminating 
statements, the police often have no way of knowing whether that suspect is 
undocumented, uninsured, or unsophisticated regarding public institutions. 
Therefore, the police should approach everyone as though they are undocumented, 
uninsured, or unsophisticated in these settings. 
A second question the Clappes case raises is why the justice system should care 
about protecting the rights of individuals like Clappes. Well, in a country that 
believes in the rule of law, the courts should worry about loopholes that cause a law 
to have a discriminatory impact on America’s most vulnerable communities.31 
Regardless of whether courts care about the particular defendant in a given scenario, 
courts should care that police practices are not violating individual rights. 
Moreover, the fact that these types of police tactics are commonly used on 
suspects who are receiving emergency medical care constitutes a Fifth Amendment 
violation that tramples on the right against self-incrimination.32 It disregards that 
 
30. See Sana Loue, Access to Health Care and the Undocumented Alien, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 271, 
280 (1992) (“[D]enials of even emergency care may not be infrequent. In addition to the difficulty 
inherent in defining and applying the ‘emergency’ standard, some private hospitals also have refused to 
treat undocumented persons who lack sufficient cash, regardless of their medical condition.”).  
31. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457–58 (“The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is 
at odds with one of our Nation’s most cherished principles—that the individual may not be compelled 
to incriminate himself.”); Colin Miller, Cloning Miranda: Why Medical Miranda Supports the  
Pre-Assertion of Criminal Miranda Rights, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 863, 887 (2015) (“The purpose, then, of 
the Miranda warning is to ensure that the statements that a suspect makes in response to custodial 
interrogation are the result of a free and rational waiver of his constitutional rights.”).  
32. See, e.g., Bretton William Hake Kreifel, Comment, Paging Constitutional  
Protections: Interrogating Vulnerable Suspects in Hospitals [People v. Sampson, 404 P.3d 273  
(Colo. 2017)], 58 WASHBURN L.J. ONLINE 25, 25 (2018) (“In People v. Sampson, the Colorado Supreme 
Court held that a police interrogation of a suspect while he was receiving medical treatment for a stab 
wound in a hospital did not violate the suspect’s rights. In doing so, the Colorado Supreme Court 
allowed police to continue to use arguably coercive interrogation techniques. This appears to run 
counter to one of the goals of Miranda warnings, which is to ensure that statements made during an 
interrogation are voluntary.”).  
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the United States must value individual liberties in order to remain “the land of the 
free and the home of the brave.”33 
In response to these problems, we need to look for ways we can better protect 
Fifth Amendment rights in these types of circumstances. “Miranda has become 
embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become 
part of our national culture.”34 The police can and should wait to question suspects 
until after they are deemed stable by medical-care professionals and released from 
the hospital. Alternatively, the police could provide these types of suspects with the 
traditional Miranda warning the police are supposed to supply all suspects before 
attempting to elicit incriminating statements. Or the police or first responders could 
inform such suspects that their refusal to speak with the police will in no way impact 
the quality of the care they receive. Any of these options would give a suspect  
the chance to remain silent and preserve their Fifth Amendment right  
against self-incrimination. 
II. JUDICIAL INTENT 
“The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is a fundamental with respect to 
the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to existing methods  
of interrogation.”35 
Because the actions of the courts, attorneys, and police can subvert the rule of 
law,36 courts must look to the purpose under which each law was established. Thus, 
the key reason why what happened to Clappes weakens the rule of law enshrined in 
the Fifth Amendment is that it tolerates a practice—pressuring an ignorant, 
disadvantaged person into self-incrimination—the Supreme Court specifically 
intended to prevent.37 
During the Criminal Constitutional Revolution, the Warren Court sought to 
protect the have-nots38 and began to incorporate rights set forth in the Bill of Rights 
into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.39 This was a major triumph 
 
33. FRANCIS SCOTT KEY, THE STAR-SPANGLED BANNER (1814); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 
460 (“[T]he privilege against self-incrimination—the essential mainstay of our adversary system—is 
founded on a complex of values.”).  
34. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 430 (2000).  
35. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476. 
36. RAZ, supra note 1, at 218 (“The discretion of the crime-preventing agencies should not be 
allowed to pervert the law. Not only the courts but also the actions of the police and the prosecuting 
authorities can subvert the law.” (emphasis omitted)).  
37. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455 (recognizing how despicable police tactics in the United States 
had become as police trade on a suspect’s “insecurity about himself or his surroundings” and “then 
persuade, trick, or cajole him out of exercising his constitutional rights”). 
38. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 
9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 103–04 (1974) (understanding that not everyone is familiar with the legal 
system and questioning whether a “legal system [that is] formally neutral as between ‘haves’ and  
‘have-nots’ may perpetuate and augment the advantages of the former”). 
39. See Lain, supra note 5, at 1363–64 (“Together, these cases produced what is widely known 
as the ‘criminal procedure revolution,’ so vast were the protections afforded to unpopular and politically 
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for the Court in creating public policy. For instance, in 1961, Mapp v. Ohio 
incorporated the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment to the states and ruled 
that illegally obtained evidence was inadmissible in a court of law.40 Then, in 1963, 
Gideon v. Wainwright incorporated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal 
trials for those unable to afford an attorney.41 Taking it one step further, in order to 
protect the public policy they had already created, the Warren Court issued its 
decision in Miranda v. Arizona and created a public policy absent constitutional 
precedent.42 Post-Miranda, people not only had the rights afforded to them with the 
Criminal Constitutional Revolution, but the police were also to inform them of all 
of these rights prior to conducting an interrogation. The police were effectively 
turned into publicity machines.43 Thus, the Warren Court in effect passed legislation 
to protect the rights of criminal defendants and then reinforced those protections 
in Miranda by using the police as their enforcement mechanism. 
The very purpose of Miranda was, and is, to ensure police officers “afford 
appropriate safeguards at the outset of the interrogation to insure that the 
statements [are] truly the product of free choice.”44 Miranda is presumed and 
deemed necessary regardless of the nature or severity of the offense any time a 
suspect is in custody, accused of a crime, and interrogated.45 To determine whether 
a suspect is in custody, the courts must consider the totality of the circumstances.46 
However, it is important to remember “[t]he purpose of Miranda guides the 
meaning of the word ‘custody,’ which refers to circumstances ‘that are thought 
generally to present a serious danger of coercion.’”47 The logic behind Miranda was 
not that every suspect is actually ignorant of their rights but that police should treat 
every suspect as though they are ignorant of their rights because some suspects are 
 
powerless criminal defendants.”). These infamous incorporation cases include but are not limited to 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Malloy v. Hogan, 378  
U.S. 1 (1964); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Miranda, 384 U.S. 436; and Washington v. Texas, 
388 U.S. 14 (1967). 
40. 367 U.S. at 657. 
41. 372 U.S. at 342–45. 
42. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 443 (“[O]ur contemplation cannot be only of what has been, but 
of what may be.” (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910))). 
43. R. Ben Brown, Professor of Legal Studies at University of California, Berkeley (Feb. 23, 
2018). Professor Brown explained the police now have to recite Miranda when the requisite conditions 
are present or risk any statements elicited being held inadmissible in a court of law. Thus, in essence, 
this Note argues that the Warren Court’s decision in Miranda turned the police into publicity machines 
of sorts. 
44. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457. 
45. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 434 (1984). 
46. People v. Boyer, 768 P.2d 610, 622 (Cal. 1989), abrogated by People v. Stansbury, 889 P.2d 
588 (Cal. 1995); see also People v. Aguilera, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 587, 593 (Ct. App. 1996) (“[Courts] look at 
the interplay and combined effect of all the circumstances to determine whether on balance they created 
a coercive atmosphere such that a reasonable person would have experienced a restraint tantamount to 
an arrest.”). 
47. People v. Caro, 442 P.3d 316, 342 (Cal.) (quoting Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 508–09 
(2012)), modified, 8 Cal. 5th 174a (2019), and cert denied, 140 S. Ct. 2682 (2020). 
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ignorant, the potential for abuse is so high, and this abuse is so repugnant.48 
Similarly, not every suspect in need of immediate medical care will believe the police 
might prevent that care; but, because some suspects are ignorant, the potential for 
abuse is so high, and this abuse is so repugnant, police ought to be required to treat 
every suspect as though they might have this confusion. 
III. FIXING LOOPHOLES IN MIRANDA 
“The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American 
criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal 
Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime.”49 
It is tempting to think of Miranda as a closed issue, but its interpretation has 
evolved to keep up with police tactics.50 A clear example of this evolution is the 
prohibition of the two-step interrogation procedure,51 which occurred 
approximately thirty-eight years after the Miranda decision. Such an interrogation 
occurs whenever police begin asking questions without a Miranda warning, learn 
something incriminating, and then issue a Miranda warning and ask the suspect to 
repeat whatever they said before the warning.52 While such a situation might arise 
innocently, it might also arise as the result of a strategic police tactic to elicit 
incriminating testimony police could not obtain if they were to initially Mirandize 
the subject. This was precisely the case in Missouri v. Seibert, where Officer 
“Hanrahan testified that he made a conscious decision to withhold Miranda warnings, 
question first, then give the warnings, and then repeat the question until he got the 
answer previously given.”53 
In Seibert, the Supreme Court’s plurality decision condemned the use of  
two-step interrogations as a strategic practice because, far from promoting the rule 
of law, it relies on the ignorance of the suspect in order to trick them into  
self-incrimination.54 This clearly violates the intent of Miranda which the court 
recognized in Seibert.55 Interrogating a suspect who is receiving emergency medical 
 
48. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469 (arguing that because “a warning is a clearcut fact,” it must be 
given at the time of interrogation no matter the background of the person being interrogated).  
49. Id. at 439. 
50. See Hilarie Bass, Promoting the Rule of Law at Home and Abroad: The Role of the ABA, 90 
N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N J., Jan. 2018, at 12, 13 (“[T]he Rule of Law is a system of checks and balances that 
needs constant and perpetual testing, nurturing and strengthening.”); see, e.g., Missouri v. Seibert, 542 
U.S. 600, 611 (2004).  
51. See Seibert, 542 U.S. 600. 
52. United States v. Narvaez-Gomez, 489 F.3d 970, 973–74 (9th Cir. 2007); Seibert, 542 U.S. at 
613 (“[T]he sensible underlying assumption is that with one confession in hand before the warnings, 
the interrogator can count on getting its duplicate, with trifling additional trouble.”).  
53. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 600 (emphasis added). 
54. See id. (“[B]ecause the midstream recitation of warnings after interrogation and unwarned 
confession in this case could not comply with Miranda’s constitutional warning requirement, Seibert’s 
postwarning statements are inadmissible.”). 
55. Id. at 617 (finding that the officer’s actions not only challenged the comprehensibility but 
also the “efficacy of the Miranda warnings to the point that a reasonable person in the suspect’s shoes 
would not have understood them to convey” that they “retained a choice about continuing to talk”).  
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care is entirely analogous. In the case of two-step interrogation, a suspect is 
technically given a Miranda warning before repeating incriminating testimony; in 
practice, however, the suspect is likely to be confused about whether they are really 
protected because they have already made incriminating statements.56 Likewise, in 
the case of an interrogation at the site of a medical emergency, the suspect is 
technically not under arrest or in the legal custody of police; but in practice, the 
suspect is likely to be confused about the consequences of noncooperation. In both 
cases, the risk of police coercion and threats of harm—so fundamental to the Fifth 
Amendment and once thought to have been eliminated by Miranda57—resurface. 
IV. THE RIGHT TO EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE 
“Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available 
outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which 
their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to 
incriminate themselves.”58 
Although not every suspect in need of immediate medical care will believe that 
the police might prevent that care, police ought to be required to treat every suspect 
as though they might have this confusion because some suspects are ignorant, the 
potential for abuse is so high, and this abuse is so repugnant. Emergency medical 
personnel are supposedly trained to treat all individuals in need of care, regardless 
of identity and insurance coverage.59 This is enshrined in professional standards and 
statutes. One such statute is the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act 
(EMTALA), which “is a federal law that requires anyone coming to an emergency 
department to be stabilized and treated, regardless of their insurance status or ability 
to pay.”60 Focusing on the interaction between law enforcement and emergency 
medical-care providers, professional standards have further committed to 
protecting patients’ rights. The medical community confirmed its commitment to 
this in The Code of Medical Ethics Opinion 9.7.4, which holds that “[t]reatment 
 
56. See id. at 601 (“The manifest purpose of question-first is to get a confession the suspect 
would not make if he understood his rights at the outset.”).  
57. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (“[T]he constitutional foundation 
underlying the privilege is the respect a government—state or federal—must accord to the dignity and 
integrity of its citizens. To maintain a ‘fair state-individual balance,’ to require the government ‘to 
shoulder the entire load,’ to respect the inviolability of the human personality, our accusatory system of 
criminal justice demands that the government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence 
against him by its own independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it 
from his own mouth.” (citation omitted)). 
58. Id. at 467. 
59. Alicia Puglionesi, Americans Once Avoided the Hospital at All Costs—Until ERs Changed 
That, HIST. (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.history.com/news/americans-once-avoided-the-hospital-at-
all-costs-until-ers-changed-that [https://perma.cc/9N5T-BQDD] (“The emergency room is the only 
type of medical facility in the U.S. where patients have a right to receive care, regardless of whether they 
carry insurance or not.”). 
60. EMTALA Fact Sheet, AM. COLL. EMERGENCY PHYSICIANS, https://www.acep.org/life-
as-a-physician/ethics--legal/emtala/emtala-fact-sheet/ [https://perma.cc/H6HP-6Z7Q] ( last visited 
May 28, 2020). 
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must never be conditional on a patient’s participation in an interrogation.”61 
Furthermore, according to the American College of Emergency Physicians, “[l]aw 
enforcement activities should not interfere with patient care.”62 
Yet, “[d]espite these statutes and penalties, hospitals have continued turning 
patients away.”63 The reality is that not everyone is aware of their right to emergency 
medical care, and some of those who are aware of their right understand that it is 
risky to pursue.64 Those who are aware know that “emergency” care is not well 
defined and that they may be turned away due to the subjective decision of an EMT, 
doctor, or nurse.65 Also, even if they are wrongfully denied care, most vulnerable 
people (undocumented, uninsured, unsophisticated, etc.) do not have the resources 
to bring a lawsuit;66 bringing a lawsuit may also lead to immigration consequences.67 
Recent immigration crackdowns have raised the fears surrounding emergency 
health care for undocumented individuals and their families.68 This becomes 
problematic as 
[t]raumatic injuries, such as gunshot wounds or motor vehicle crash 
injuries, are conditions that attract both health care and law enforcement 
responses. In these circumstances, clinicians and police share a mandate to 
protect injured people and public safety. However, the police mission to 
initiate an investigation and solve crimes may compete with the urgency of 
 
61. AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, at Op. 9.7.4 (2017), https://www.ama-
assn.org/delivering-care/ethics/physician-participation-interrogation [https://perma.cc/Z9W2-QW5Q]. 
62. Law Enforcement Information Gathering in the Emergency Department, 56 ANNALS 




63. Jeffrey Kahntroff & Rochelle Watson, Refusal of Emergency Care and Patient Dumping, 11 
VIRTUAL MENTOR 49, 49 (2009) (“EMTALA’s inability to curb denial of treatment has been attributed 
to the ambiguity of the statutory provisions, poor enforcement mechanisms, and divergent judicial 
interpretations of the statutory provisions.”). 
64. See Loue, supra note 30, at 297 (“An alien denied care on that basis would be forced to seek 
care elsewhere and then litigate the issue of coverage by the relevant statute. Most undocumented aliens 
would not pursue such litigation due to a fear of detection by the INS during the course of the 
proceedings.”); Mary Gerisch, Health Care as a Human Right, 43 HUM. RTS., Aug. 1, 2018, at 2, 5 
(“[O]ur country has long deluded us into believing insurance, not health, is our right.”). 
65. See Kahntroff & Watson, supra note 63, at 50 (“The EMTALA requirement that emergency 
personnel provide appropriate medical screening within the capability of the emergency department, 
for example, can be interpreted under an objectively reasonable standard, subjective standard, or 
burden-shifting standard.”). 
66. Loue, supra note 30, at 312 (“The cost of litigation also may foreclose the possibility of a 
private lawsuit.”). 
67. Id. (“The affirmative undertaking of a lawsuit may raise fears of INS action at the 
commencement of the suit or during its pendency, whether as the result of publicity or of unfriendly 
phone calls to the INS advising the agency of the individual’s presence.”). 
68. Rebecca Adams, Immigration Crackdown Raises Fears of Seeking Health Care, ROLL CALL 
( Jan. 25, 2018, 11:22 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/2018/01/25/immigration-crackdown-raises-
fears-of-seeking-health-care/ [https://perma.cc/5GXC-RV5S].  
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emergency health care, which is built on protocol-driven systems for rapid 
diagnosis, medical stabilization, and triage.69 
Moreover, a police officer’s apparent authority over the scene of a crime or 
investigation may lead an injured suspect to believe they have no choice but to 
comply and incriminate themselves by answering the officer’s questions.70 A 
reasonable person observing a police officer’s uniform, badge, holstered gun, and 
command of individuals at the scene of the accident or in the emergency room 
could conclude that the officer has some measure of authority over medical 
personnel. Any doubt in such a matter must cut in favor of the defendant, who 
depends on undelayed, uninterrupted, and unrestricted medical care to treat pain, 
prevent complication, and save life. Justice Abrahamson acknowledges this issue in 
her dissent in State v. Clappes, in which she argues that 
[t]he mere presence of police, their appearance of authority, and perilous 
surrounding circumstances which threaten the life of a helpless 
individual—all of these in conjunction may pressure the individual and 
force a statement. The police may not apply the pressure; but in appearance 
they may still control the means of its release.71 
V. WHOSE REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD? THE SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF A 
“COLORBLIND”72 RULE OF LAW 
“The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional 
rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so 
simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of 
his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of the knowledge the defendant 
possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with 
authorities, can never be more than speculation; a warning is a clearcut fact.”73 
In the current jurisprudence on this topic, courts continually dismiss 
defendants’ complaints that the incriminating statements they made while receiving 
 
69. Sara F. Jacoby, Elinore J. Kaufman, Therese S. Richmond & Daniel N. Holena, When Health 
Care and Law Enforcement Intersect in Trauma Care, What Rules Apply?, HEALTH AFFS.: HEALTH 
AFFS. BLOG (Oct. 1, 2018), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20180926.69826/full/ 
[https://perma.cc/8S8T-P76T]. 
70. See Caleb Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle or Necessity in the Law of Arrest?, 51  
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 402, 403 (1960) (recognizing that what may appear “on their face [as] 
merely words of request take on color from the officer’s uniform, badge, gun and demeanor”); see also 
Charles A. Reich, Police Questioning of Law Abiding Citizens, 75 YALE L.J. 1161, 1162 (1966) (“There 
is authority in the approach of the police, and command in their tone. I can ignore the ordinary person, 
but can I ignore the police?”). 
71. 401 N.W.2d 759, 771 (Wis. 1987) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Clappes, 
No. 84-2001-CR, 1985 WL 188241, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 1985). 
72. Erik Lillquist & Charles A. Sullivan, The Law and Genetics of Racial Profiling in Medicine, 39 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 391, 391–94 (2004) (admitting that medical professionals are not colorblind 
and that “[m]odern medicine has embraced the use of race” because failure to do so is a mistake  
as these professionals “no doubt will be influenced by the unconscious biases that plague  
American society”).  
73. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468–69 (1966). 
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emergency medical care, without being Mirandized, are unconstitutionally elicited 
and thus inadmissible in a court of law.74 In doing this, the courts overwhelmingly 
argue that no Miranda warning is required in such situations because the 
interrogations are not in fact custodial: the suspects are not in custody at the time 
of questioning.75 However, the determination of whether a defendant is in custody 
at the time of their interrogation is based on the totality of circumstances.76 The 
determination asks whether or not a reasonable person in the defendant’s position 
would feel free to terminate the conversation and leave.77 If the answer is no, the 
interrogation is in fact custodial in nature.78 
The reality in these emergency medical-care cases is that the identity of the 
defendant matters because not everyone in the United States believes that a  
medical-care professional has a duty to the patient to provide care.79 Dominant 
groups80 likely take medical care for granted in the United States. Meanwhile, other 
 
74. See, e.g., Wilson v. Coon, 808 F.2d 688, 690 (8th Cir. 1987) (“A reasonable person would 
perceive this detention as imposed only for purposes of a medical examination, not a police 
interrogation. Detention for a medical examination is not a situation that a reasonable person would 
find inherently coercive in the sense required by Miranda.”); People v. Carbonaro, 23 N.Y.S.3d 525, 
529 (App. Div. 2015) (“[D]efendant was not in custody when he was questioned by the same deputy in 
the hospital trauma bay . . . .”); State v. Esser, 480 N.W.2d 541, 542 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (determining 
that despite the fact that the defendant’s “injuries certainly limited his mobility and caused him distress,” 
because “these conditions were not the result of any police conduct,” the questioning was not custodial 
and thus the motion to suppress was properly denied). 
75. See, e.g., United States v. Jamison, 509 F.3d 623, 633 (4th Cir. 2007) (“The police posed 
questions to [the defendant] and restricted his freedom of action, but only to the degree necessary to 
investigate the crime. Their activities did not transform [his] hospital interview into a custodial 
interrogation. As [his] statements were not made under custodial interrogation, Miranda warnings were 
not required, and the statements should not have been suppressed.”). 
76. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 100 (1995), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. See Monique Tello, Racism and Discrimination in Health Care: Providers and Patients,  
HARV. HEALTH PUBL’G: HARV. HEALTH BLOG ( July 9, 2020, 12:34 PM), https://
www.health.harvard.edu/blog/racism-discrimination-health-care-providers-patients-2017011611015 
[https://perma.cc/P6ES-6H2S] (“Doctors take an oath to treat all patients equally, and yet not all 
patients are treated equally well.”); see also Austin Frakt, Bad Medicine: The Harm That Comes From 
Racism, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT ( July 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/13/upshot/bad-
medicine-the-harm-that-comes-from-racism.html [https://perma.cc/93AR-EMD6] (“Put simply, 
people of color receive less care — and often worse care — than white Americans. Reasons includes 
[sic] lower rates of health coverage; communication barriers; and racial stereotyping based on false 
beliefs.”); Aaron E. Carroll, Doctors and Racial Bias: Still a Long Way to Go, N.Y. TIMES: UPSHOT 
(Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/25/upshot/doctors-and-racial-bias-still-a-long-
way-to-go.html [https://perma.cc/U3PF-YWY3] (“Of course, there’s the issue of mistrust on the 
patient side. African-American patients have good reason to mistrust the health care system; the 
infamous Tuskegee Study is just one example.”). 
80. By “dominant groups,” this Note is referring to those individuals that are aware of and feel 
entitled to unfettered access to health care. For example, those who are not uninsured, undocumented, 
or green card holders. It also excludes those who have empirically or historically received subpar medical 
care (e.g., African-American women).  
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groups do not have such a luxury.81 This is especially true for minority patients who 
become suspects as “[r]ace and ethnicity are consistently linked with different and 
poorer patterns of health access and treatment.”82 The reality—something a court 
should not pretend to be ignorant of—is that a reasonable person may be unsure as 
to whether medical professionals will treat them with the same quality of care if they 
refuse to answer an officer’s questions. Therefore, as Miranda was created to protect 
the most vulnerable in our society,83 a reasonable person interacting with a law 
enforcement officer while receiving emergency medical care may not feel free to 
terminate the conversation and leave, meaning the interrogation should be deemed 
custodial. Thus, at the very least, a Miranda warning should be provided to  
the suspect. 
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTION 
“The defendant who does not ask for counsel is the very defendant who most  
needs counsel.”84 
To work on closing this loophole, society must mobilize not only the courts 
but also attorneys and lawmakers. Thus, the solution this Note proposes 
is threefold. 
A. Role of the Courts 
There is no doubt that the courts could harness substantial power in working 
to close this loophole. The courts should work to expand what is considered 
“custodial” to represent the actual judicial intent behind Miranda and also to create 
a version of Miranda that requires officers to explain to suspects that their 
unwillingness to speak with police will in no way affect their medical treatment. 
Courts have ruled on the side of equity in the past, only to be overruled by higher 
courts that fear the implications of such equity. For example, in State v. Clappes, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court struck down the appeals court’s decision that the 
defendant’s interrogation while receiving emergency medical care was custodial for 
fear that it had “the effect of creating a per se rule prohibiting police questioning of 
 
81. Khiara M. Bridges, Implicit Bias and Racial Disparities in Health Care, 43  
HUM. RTS., Aug. 1, 2018, at 19, 19 (“Black people simply are not receiving the same quality of health 
care that their white counterparts receive, and this second-rate health care is shortening their lives.”); 
Robert Pearl, Why Health Care Is Different if You’re Black, Latino or Poor, FORBES (Mar. 5, 2015, 12:59 
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertpearl/2015/03/05/healthcare-black-latino-poor/#58f982 
467869 [https://perma.cc/AWA4-H7JE] (“African-Americans, Latinos and the economically 
disadvantaged experience poorer health care access and lower quality of care than white Americans. 
And in most measures, that gap is growing.”). 
82. Sidney D. Watson, Race, Ethnicity and Quality of Care: Inequalities and Incentives, 27  
AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 205 (2001). 
83. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 472 (1966). 
84. Id. at 471 (quoting People v. Dorado, 398 P.2d 361, 369–70 (Cal. 1965)).  
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individuals while they are undergoing medical treatment for injuries sustained while 
engaging in potentially criminal activity.”85 
Despite the reversal by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, courts should continue 
to make these decisions in favor of equity and risk being overturned by higher 
courts. If lower courts stop fighting for equity, the change will never come. 
Meanwhile, intermediate and higher courts must consider what overturning a lower 
court decision, as the court did in State v. Clappes, means for the rule of law. If the 
law is being abused to coerce vulnerable suspects to make incriminating statements, 
will it ever truly be respected? Will criminal justice institutions in the United States 
be regarded as just and fair, especially by marginalized groups who are being judged 
by a standard of reasonableness that does not fit their identity? To ensure fairness, 
when someone is receiving emergency medical care, courts must require the police 
to deliver a Miranda warning or some other type of instruction indicating that their 
refusal to speak with police will not impede the quality of such care. Without such 
an instruction, incriminating testimony must be inadmissible in a court of law. 
B. Role of Attorneys 
In addition to the courts, attorneys play an important role in closing this 
loophole as “[m]embers of the Bar are guardians of the [r]ule of [l]aw.”86 If attorneys 
do not continue to fight for their clients and make these arguments, the necessary 
changes will never happen. Even if courts in a particular jurisdiction have not yet 
barred statements obtained from medical emergency interrogations absent Miranda, 
such interrogations violate the spirit of the Fifth Amendment and Miranda. Further, 
defense attorneys have a duty to zealously defend their clients by moving to exclude 
evidence obtained in this way.87 If attorneys keep bringing the fight to the courts 
over and over again, it will eventually work.88 
 
85. 401 N.W.2d 759, 761 (Wis. 1987). 
86. Michael W. McKay, Defending and Upholding the Rule of Law, 52 LA. BAR J. 90, 90 (2004) 
(“While others seek to tear down or limit the Rule of Law, our goal must be to strengthen and maintain 
it. While others seek to act and profit while avoiding or limiting their responsibilities, we seek to 
maintain and broaden access to our courts.”).  
87. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“A lawyer should 
pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience to the 
lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause  
or endeavor.”).  
88. It actually already has in rare circumstances; courts have suppressed evidence that was 
obtained absent a Miranda warning from defendants interrogated while receiving emergency medical 
care. See, e.g., State v. Lowe, 81 A.3d 360, 367 (Me. 2013) (affirming suppression of evidence where 
defendant was hospitalized and questioned in her hospital room without Miranda even though she was 
considered a suspect in a criminal case); United States v. Trejo-Islas, 248 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1078  
(D. Utah 2002) (suppressing defendant’s statements made to an INS officer because defendant was 
interrogated without Miranda while in a hospital bed and unable to leave, as defendant just underwent 
an accident in which his vehicle rolled over several times). 
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C. Role of Lawmakers 
Legislatures also have an interest in protecting their communities’ rights 
against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment and their respective state 
constitutions.89 Although interpreting the law is primarily the responsibility of the 
judiciary, when loopholes exist, legislatures need to pass clarifying legislation to 
strengthen the rule of law set by the judiciary.90 Lawmakers should also work to 
ensure defendants know their right to medical care is not dependent on their 
willingness to speak with the police because “[i]njured people, themselves, are  
rarely in a position to advocate for their own medical and legal needs during  
emergency care.”91 
CONCLUSION 
“The privilege against self-incrimination secured by the Constitution applies to  
all individuals.”92 
The rule of law only holds power if it is respected. In the case of interrogations 
during emergency medical care with no Miranda warning, the rule of law is being 
circumvented by overzealous police officers. When courts admit testimony 
obtained this way by equivocating over the word “custody,” they trivialize the rule 
of law by allowing decisions about life and liberty to rest on an imperceptible 
difference between the ability to leave and the freedom to leave. Accordingly, belief 
in the right against self-incrimination and a broader belief in the rule of law cannot 
gain traction in marginalized communities until major loopholes that allow the 
police “to take advantage of indigence in the administration of justice” are closed.93 
Therefore, the courts must expand what is considered “custodial” to represent the 
actual judicial intent behind Miranda. This does not require the courts to expand the 
rights of the accused; it requires them to close a loophole in an existing right. 
 
89. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
90. The history of voting rights since the Fifteenth Amendment provides a clear example of the 
legislature stepping in to fill the gaps courts create. Although the Fifteenth Amendment itself prohibits 
the denial of suffrage based on race or color, U.S. CONST. amend. XV, a number of jurisdictions had 
implemented voting requirements, such as literacy tests, that tended to primarily affect African 
Americans. In Lassiter v. Northampton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959), the U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld these literacy tests as constitutional, provided they were not used for discriminatory 
purposes. This focus on intent left broad discretionary power in the hands of local officials, making it 
nearly impossible to enforce the rule of law. Later, the legislature stepped in because the courts failed 
to, and the tests were prohibited by Congress in the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which also strengthened 
the rule of law by subjecting changes in local voting requirements to court review for discriminatory 
effects. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437. 
91. Jacoby et al., supra note 69. 
92. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 472 (1966). 
93. Id. 
